Op-Ed: Canada has much to learn from the Israel-Iran war as we boost defence spending

(Photo by: Leo Correa/The Associated Press)

Canada has much to learn from the Israel-Iran war as we boost defence spending

Author: Eliot Pence

From The Globe and Mail on June 27, 2025 - the article can be found here;

Eliot Pence is the founder of Tofino Capital and the former head of international growth for Anduril Industries.

Prime Minister Mark Carney on Wednesday committed to the biggest defence-spending increase in generations: a bump to 5 per cent of the economy by 2035. We have not seen such a number since the Second World War.

How exactly should we go about this spending? The newly paused war between Israel and Iran offers some lessons.

The ceasefire this week follows one of the largest air campaigns in Middle Eastern history. Over a span of just 10 days, Iran launched roughly 1,000 drones and more than 550 ballistic missiles at Israel – the largest direct strike ever by Tehran.

In response, Israel conducted a sweeping counteroffensive: it pre-emptively destroyed nearly 950 drones before launch, struck over 120 missile launchers, and reportedly intercepted 90 per cent of incoming missiles.

This exchange didn’t escalate into a broader regional war, but it could have. Its brevity masked its intensity. More importantly, it exposes two parallel – and increasingly divergent – modes of modern conflict.

The first is rapid, high-volume escalation. The Iran–Israel exchange resembled a “flash war” –short in duration but extreme in demands. Defence required more than just advanced systems; it required volume. Israel’s layered defence, from its Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems to its Arrow-3 anti-ballistic missiles, performed impressively. But it also required deep stockpiles and industrial resilience. The pace and scale of intercepts raised uncomfortable questions: how long could such a defence be sustained if the barrage had continued for another week? Or a month?

The second type of warfare is the one Iran has relied on for decades: long-term, attritional, and proxy-driven. Houthi drone attacks on shipping in the Red Sea launched from Yemen, rocket fire from Hezbollah in Lebanon, and years of militia activity in Syria and Iraq all represent this slow-burning form of conflict. It doesn’t seek rapid escalation but instead applies continuous pressure – stretching logistics, fraying political cohesion, and forcing costly deployments over years, not days. Modern militaries must now contend with both.

Canada on Wednesday joined 31 other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in committing to the new target: core military spending of 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product and another 1.5 per cent of GDP for infrastructure that is defence-related. As Mr. Carney looks to upgrade Canada’s Armed Forces, this duality of modern warfare we recently saw in the Middle East should be instructive.

What the war in Ukraine began to prove – that attritable systems such as loitering munitions, quadcopters, and off-the-shelf electronic-warfare kits are not auxiliary but essential –the Iran–Israel conflict has now reinforced: even technologically advanced countries are constrained by their ability to produce and replenish at speed.

This means rethinking procurement and production. Exquisite systems like the F-35 or submarines take years, billions, and vertically integrated supply chains. But attritable systems require speed, iteration, and commercial adaptability. These two production models are not interchangeable. They demand different industrial bases, different cultures, and different capital structures.

Canada’s defence posture must therefore evolve to accommodate both. We need a force that can deter state-level threats and respond to proxy engagements; one that can deploy the $5-million jet and the $5,000 drone in complementary fashion.

That means empowering small manufacturers as much as large traditional defence contractors, funding five-week engineering and design sprint cycles alongside five-year acquisition programs, and adjusting military doctrine and strategy to account for both attrition and escalation.

If we fail to adapt, we risk being caught in the middle – too slow to deploy the scalable, too overstretched to modernize expensive equipment and capabilities. But if we succeed, we can combine speed with precision, resilience with sophistication, and field a force ready not just for one kind of war – but for both.